RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to adorn the twilight of his presidency with a success story in his self-proclaimed ‘War on Terror’, President Bush should implement a high-intensity, Fast Track policy for Somalia and Somaliland that pushes the former towards stability and rewards the latter for its significant achievements over the past decade. Fast tracking Somaliland recognition will send a shock wave to Somalia, and send a clear message that peace and prosperity can be rewarded without the need to use overpowering military force.

To date, efforts to resolve the crisis that has blighted Somalia have been half hearted and misconceived. Meanwhile, the Horn of Africa’s beacon of stability – Somaliland – continues to toil in relative anonymity, receiving little recognition for its remarkable progress towards creating a viable, stand-alone state.

Somaliland has succeeded where the TFG has failed because it possesses precisely those attributes that Somalia lacks: democratically elected institutions with domestic legitimacy, institutions that serve as a repository of nationalism and sovereignty etc. Fighting terrorism is therefore a domestic priority (it was enshrined in the constitution long before 9/11) since extremist violence threatens the institutions of statehood and the common aspiration to international recognition.

Somaliland has not abandoned 'hard' CT tasks (intelligence gathering, capture/kill etc), but its placement of these tasks within a broader, integrated national framework has been successful. The TFG will not be able to succeed at CT, despite US and Ethiopian support, unless it follows Somaliland's example.

Somalia

Efforts to stabilise Somalia are in desperate need of reinvigoration. The lack of strategic acumen present in the War on Terror-driven approach is entrenching the chaos present throughout the country, making the prospect of a rebuilt and fully functioning Somali state a Utopian vision that will never be realised.

Successfully navigating a path through the minefield that is Somali clan politics a patient and nuanced approach. For instance, it is essential that all constituent parts of the TFG feel equally rewarded by any resolution, but are not allowed to dominate or control the country as a result.

A re-engineered counter-terrorism campaign based upon Smart Power tenets should include the following Key Success Indicators, which can be separated into high-impact quick wins and long-term developmental measures.

High Impact, Quick Win

1. Deliver aid to refugees outside of Mogadishu;
2. Support the prime minister and United Nations Special Representative’s efforts at reconciliation process, including moderate elements of Islamic Courts;
3. Halt all kinetic operations in Somalia;
4. The culture of impunity in Somalia must end. Counter-productive elements of the TFG must be identified and stripped of their diplomatic rights, regardless of their seniority;
5. Transitional tasks should be identified and an action plan for their resolution established: cessation of hostilities, security arrangements, constitutional dialogue, and electoral system/process need to be addressed before longer term developmental issues are addressed.

Long Term, Developmental

1. Higher levels of engagement with the Somali people, in particular key stakeholders in civil society and moderate Islamist movements. Somalia is an ‘accountability-free zone’, and this needs to be addressed. For instance, the TFG should empower a number of targeted communities to assume control over the promotion of peace in their locality;
2. Structural elements of the conflict must be addressed; natural connectors between disparate groups need to be identified and nurtured. Only efforts at resolving the underlying drivers of instability can promote a link between the ordinary Somali, a nascent government in Mogadishu, and the international community. Hence land disputes, clan grievances, unemployment, economic stagnation, and lack of equitable wealth distribution must all form part of a policy framework for Somalia;
3. An early conclusion of a cessation of hostilities should stipulate the phased withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in coordination with deployment of a UN Peace Support Operation. This force should be composed of at least 20,000 troops, contain no forces from contiguous states, and contain a significant number of Muslims from African countries;
4. The raison d’être of the international military mission in the country must be clearly articulated, and come to be viewed as a positive force for change. It must cease all activities against the state, and start to act in the interests of ordinary Somalis by delivering aid and securing stable zones for IDPs;
5. The country’s multitude of clan elders and politicians must engage with the peace process, otherwise a credible government of national unity cannot eventuate.

A Road Map to Somaliland Recognition

A fast track to recognition is urgently needed for Somaliland:

1. It should be encouraged to hold a free and fair referendum on independence that adheres to internationally agreed standards – this will remove any uncertainly over the significance of its last referendum on the Constitution, held in 2001;
2. Transition to an open, multi-party system must be completed, and the balance between the executive and legislature entrenched;
3. Judiciary firmly established, with enforceable rule of law extending throughout the country;
4. Resolution to territorial dispute with Puntland, through international arbitration if necessary;
5. The capacity of Somalia to block any progressive discourse on Somaliland within the African Union entrenches organisational inertia. This de facto veto capacity must be rebalanced;
6. The United Nations should grant Somaliland the capability to make direct representations to the Security Council;
7. The US government should rebalance its aid outlays in order to reward Somaliland. Overall levels of development assistance are also woefully inadequate; US aid to Somalia overall stood at just USD 73.7 million in 2007.